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Abstract
We run a laboratory experiment to test the concept of coarse correlated equilibrium 
(Moulin and Vial in Int J Game Theory 7:201–221, 1978), with a two-person game 
with unique pure Nash equilibrium which is also the solution of iterative elimina-
tion of strictly dominated strategies. The subjects are asked to commit to a device 
that randomly picks one of three symmetric outcomes (including the Nash point) 
with higher ex-ante expected payoff than the Nash equilibrium payoff. We find that 
the subjects do not accept this lottery (which is a coarse correlated equilibrium); 
instead, they choose to play the game and coordinate on the Nash equilibrium. How-
ever, given an individual choice between a lottery with equal probabilities of the 
same outcomes and the sure payoff as in the Nash point, the lottery is chosen by 
the subjects. This result is robust against a few variations. We explain our result as 
selecting risk-dominance over payoff dominance in equilibrium.
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1 Introduction
The problem of multiple equilibria and coordination in games, even in a 2 × 2 
game, has been one of the major themes of research in experimental econom-
ics (Cooper et al. 1989, 1990, 1992; Van Huyck et al. 1990, 1991, 1992; Straub 
1995). Experimental research suggests that players are able to coordinate if they 
are helped to do so (see Devetag and Ortmann 2007 for a survey) or by using 
features such as, risk-dominance (Cabrales et  al. 2000), pre-play non-binding 
communication (Crawford 1998; Costa-Gomes 2002; Camerer 2003; Burton et al. 
2005; Cabrales et al. 2018). On the other side, there may be a different problem in 
a game where there is no issue of coordination at all as the game may have a clear 
unique pure Nash equilibrium; however, this equilibrium may be improved upon 
by using a lottery involving several other outcomes if the players agree to commit 
to such a plan.
Committing to a lottery in a game has been captured in the notion of coarse 
correlation. In a coarse correlated equilibrium (Moulin and Vial 1978), a media-
tor first asks the players to either commit to a device (and thereby get the outcome 
that the device would select using a given probability distribution) or to reject 
the device (and subsequently play any strategy of their own in the game, without 
learning anything about the outcome from the device).
The equilibrium concept, coarse correlated equilibrium, has many merits; it is 
computationally tractable, and hence it is also useful in bounding the set of Nash 
equilibria, for instance in congestion games (see Roughgarden 2016). Coarse cor-
relation may improve upon the Nash equilibrium payoff for oligopolies (Gerard-
Varet and Moulin 1978) and other potential games that correlated equilibrium 
cannot (see Ray and Sen Gupta 2013; Moulin et al. 2014 and Dokka et al. 2019 
for details). The notion of coarse correlation has a natural interpretation in many 
economic situations, such as the abatement game (Barrett 1994) in environmental 
economics (see Forgó et al. 2005 and Forgó 2011 who used notions of correlation 
in other environmental games as well). This equilibrium concept has received a 
lot of attention recently in algorithmic game theory literature (for example, Feld-
man et al. 2016 who studied the correlated and coarse correlated equilibria in a 
full information first-price auction of a single item). Reischmann and Oechssler 
(2018) suggested a new simple mechanism called the Binary Conditional Con-
tribution Mechanism (BCCM) that implements a coarse correlated outcome of a 
repeated public good provision and found strong support for such a mechanism 
in their experiments. Awaya and Krishna (2019, 2020) studied the role of in-play 
communication in repeated games and linked the Nash equilibrium to the coarse 
correlated equilibrium payoffs of the single-shot game due to the computational 
ease of the latter. This kind of structure is common to many economic situations 
of interest, such as, expending effort (Fleckinger 2012; Deb et al. 2016), contrib-
uting towards public good (Moulin et  al. 2014), gathering information (Gromb 
and Martimort 2007).
There is a literature on experiments with correlated devices that recommend 
strategies to the players according to a probability distribution (see Moreno and 
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Wooders 1998; Cason and Sharma 2007; Duffy and Feltovich 2010; Bone et al. 
2013; Duffy et al. 2017; Anbarci et al. 2018), to test the validity of the concept of 
correlated equilibrium (Aumann 1974, 1987); however, to the best of our knowl-
edge, there has been no attempt to understand the notion of coarse correlation 
in an experimental set-up. The purpose of this paper is to understand, using a 
laboratory experiment, whether individuals are willing to commit to a device that 
improves upon the pure Nash outcome in a game or not.
We use a two-person game (introduced by Moulin and Vial 1978) with unique 
pure Nash equilibrium which is also the solution of the iterative elimination of 
strictly dominated strategies (and therefore, the unique correlated equilibrium). We 
then take a lottery with equal probabilities of three symmetric outcomes (includ-
ing the Nash equilibrium), which is a coarse correlated equilibrium with ex-ante 
expected payoff higher than the unique Nash equilibrium payoff. The question we 
ask is simple: which prevails—playing the unique Nash or accepting the coarse 
correlation device? We also contrast the choice of committing to the device for the 
game with an individual problem of choosing between a lottery with equal prob-
abilities of these three payoffs and the sure payoff as in the Nash equilibrium of the 
game.
Our main result is that at the individual choice level, the lottery is chosen; how-
ever, in a game, we find that the subjects do not accept this lottery (the coarse corre-
lation device). Instead, they play the game and choose the Nash equilibrium. We also 
find that the proportion of the Nash equilibrium outcome is the highest in the treat-
ment without any correlation. Thus, the answer to our question is: Nash prevails!
We addressed three different types of robustness checks for our main result. First 
of all, admittedly, one may find a lack of comparability between an individual lot-
tery and the coarse correlation device. The results in these two are different from 
each other perhaps due to “other regarding” preferences. We have thus checked our 
result using a lottery for a pair which is considerably closer to the coarse correlated 
equilibrium in the game and found very similar result. Second, one may ask whether 
committing to the device (to get higher expected payoffs) increases if the players’ 
relationship were repeated, as each player is then likely to get the higher payoff 
sometimes (as in Kaplan and Ruffle 2012). We however find no such indication from 
fixed-match pairs. Finally, we checked the robustness by varying payoffs using three 
other similar games, however we found results analogous to the main result.
How do we interpret our main result? One possible implication of our work is 
that our subjects are averse to random devices (as in Keren and Teigen 2010) and 
favour ex-post equality in outcomes (as in Cappelen et al. 2013). Our result is in line 
with Andreoni et al. (2002) who found that the equilibrium prediction may fail when 
the equilibrium outcome consists of unequal payoffs. In our set-up, the device used 
is procedurally fair, however the outcomes generated by the device are not fair (simi-
lar in nature to different strands of work such as Bolton et al. 2005; Krawczyk 2011; 
Trautmann and Vieider 2012; Trautmann and van de Kuilen 2016). The socially pre-
ferred outcome here is indeed the Nash equilibrium outcome.
We may explain the observed phenomenon of not committing to the device as an 
equilibrium behaviour. Accepting the device is a Nash equilibrium of the extended 
game, extended by the (coarse correlation) device; however, this equilibrium may 
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not be unique and there may be other (Nash) equilibria of the extended game. 
Indeed, rejecting the correlation device and playing the unique Nash equilibrium 
of the game is a risk-dominant equilibrium in a modified version of the extended 
game. It is well-known in the literature that in such games (Aumann 1990) risk-
dominant outcomes are observed (Cabrales et al. 2000; Charness 2000). Cason and 
Sharma (2007) also provide evidence consistent with our result; in their experiment 
on correlated equilibrium, if an agent does not follow recommendations from a cor-
related equilibrium, it is because she believes that her opponent will not follow the 
recommendation.
1.1  Related literature
As it is well-known now, a correlated equilibrium (Aumann 1974, 1987) can be 
interpreted as a mediator who selects and sends to each player a private recommen-
dation to play a strategy in a game that each player finds optimal to follow. A fairly 
well-established experimental literature analyses the use of correlation devices in 
normal form games to understand this issue of following a mediator and thereby 
coordinating in a game. The main message of this literature (see Moreno and Wood-
ers 1998; Cason and Sharma 2007; Duffy and Feltovich 2010; Bone et  al. 2013; 
Duffy et al. 2017; Anbarci et al. 2018) is that the subjects do follow recommenda-
tions from a correlation device when the device is indeed a correlated equilibrium. 
Duffy and Feltovich (2010) also showed that the subjects learn to ignore the recom-
mendations which are not based on a correlated equilibrium.
Our current work lies within the above research agenda. In this paper as well, we 
found very similar results using a treatment on correlated equilibrium for the spe-
cific game and device we used. However, our specific correlation device can also be 
used to test the issue of commitment to a device and thereby to analyse the notion 
of coarse correlated equilibrium (Moulin and Vial 1978). This paper provides a new 
result and insight: our subjects do not commit to a (coarse) correlation device that 
picks, with equal probability, the pure Nash outcome and other symmetric outcomes 
around Nash point of the game; however, they do accept a lottery, mimicking the 
device, as an individual choice.
To the best of our knowledge, our paper is the first such attempt to analyse com-
mitment to a (coarse) correlation device. There are of course related papers in the 
literature. Any convex combination over pure Nash equilibrium outcomes (thus a 
public lottery) can also be viewed as a correlated equilibrium. Indeed, Cason and 
Sharma (2007), Duffy and Feltovich (2010) and Bone et al. (2013) used a (public) 
correlated equilibrium that randomly selects one of the two pure Nash equilibria in 
symmetric 2 × 2 games like Battle of the Sexes (BoS) and showed that the subjects 
do play the recommended strategies. Anbarci et al. (2018) provided a design to test 
how correlated equilibrium performs in BoS type games with different sets of pay-
offs. The main message of their paper is that the subjects do not like recommenda-
tions that lead to unequal payoffs, which is similar in nature to our main result in this 
paper.
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Duffy et al. (2017) studied normal form games with multiple Nash equilibrium; 
the main question addressed there is how the subjects coordinate on any equilib-
rium, particularly when there are ex-ante symmetric equilibria to choose from. Their 
paper used a version of BoS and considered different treatments to study coordina-
tion using perfectly correlated signals. In addition, their paper also asked how, if 
at all, players use different coded language (in terms of indirect messages that are 
not directly related to actions in the game) to achieve coordination. The device we 
have used in this paper is a randomisation involving non-Nash outcomes, and thus is 
not a correlated equilibrium; our experimental results in this paper does confirm the 
findings of Cason and Sharma (2007), Duffy and Feltovich (2010) and Duffy et al. 
(2017) in the literature.
The specific type of correlation device used in this paper also relates to “sun-
spots”; thus, the experimental literature on public information (McKelvey and Page 
1990; Marimon et  al. 1993; McCabe et  al. 2000; Anctil et  al. 2004; Heinemann 
et  al. 2004) and that on sunspot equilibrium become relevant to our study and to 
the results we found in this paper. Duffy and Fisher (2005) introduced sunspots as 
coordination devices using randomisation over equilibria and provided a direct evi-
dence of sunspot equilibria in markets. Stahl (2013) and Camera et al. (2013) used 
randomised messages for cooperation in Prisoners’ Dilemma; Brandts and Macleod 
(1995) and Seely et al. (2005) analysed public recommendations while Fehr et al. 
(2019) and Arifovic et  al. (2013) studied sunspot-driven strategies. Arifovic and 
Jiang (2014) studied the simple bank-run game by Diamond and Dybvig (1983) and 
analysed situations in which sunspots matter through a laboratory study. Kaplan 
and Ruffle (2012) investigated models of cooperation through a class of two-player 
games that requires the players to coordinate on which player cooperates and who 
gets to defect, so as to achieve the socially efficient outcome. Our paper fits well 
within this literature as well.
In our set-up, the (coarse) correlation device is not accepted perhaps because 
accepting the device implies that an individual does not “win” in two out of three 
possible outcomes. This interpretation is similar in nature to the findings of Keren 
and Teigen (2010) who have shown aversion to use random devices and of Cappelen 
et al. (2013) who have demonstrated that most individuals favour some redistribu-
tion ex-post. Our main result can possibly be derived from the notion of strategic 
uncertainty as well which may relate to the work by Van Huyck et al. (1990) who 
have provided experimental evidence on how subjects behave in case of strategic 
uncertainty. Their paper studied a class of pure coordination games with multiple 
equilibria that are Pareto ranked; it showed coordination-failure may resulting from 
strategic uncertainty as some subjects conclude that it was too “risky” to choose the 
payoff-dominant action and most subjects focused on outcomes in earlier periods.
Our result is also connected to the work by Andreoni et al. (2002) who found that 
the equilibrium prediction may fail when the equilibrium results in unequal distribu-
tions of payoffs, and there are alternative outcomes involving equality. It is also anal-
ogous to Machina’s (1989) parental example where the child (among the two chil-
dren) who loses the toss and does not like the outcome ex-post. Finally, our paper is 
related to a literature (Bolton et al. 2005; Krawczyk 2011; Trautmann and Vieider 
2012; Trautmann and van de Kuilen 2016) that distinguishes between preferences 
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for outcome fairness (where the agent is concerned about the actual distribution of 
payoffs) and preferences for process fairness (where the agent is concerned about the 
random process by which outcomes are created, but not what these outcomes actu-
ally are).
2  Theoretical framework
We first briefly recall some theoretical concepts behind our experiment. Here, we 
closely follow the notations and definitions of a few notions from Moulin et  al. 
(2014), Ray and Sen Gupta (2013) and Kar et al. (2010), where more details can be 
found.
Consider any fixed finite normal form game, G = [N, {Si}i∈N , {ui}i∈N] , with set 
of players, N = {1,… , n} , finite pure strategy sets, S1,… , Sn with S =
∏
i∈N Si , and 
payoff functions, u1,… , un , ui ∶ S → ℜ , for all i. A direct correlation device, 휇 , for 
such a game G, is simply a probability distribution over S. In this paper, we will 
consider direct correlation devices only and therefore in what follows, we will call 
such a device just a correlation device, or a device, in short, for convenience. G can 
be extended by using a device 휇 . An extended game G휇 is the game where the device 
selects a strategy profile s ( = (s1,… , sn) ) according to the probability distribution 
and sends private recommendation si to each player i, and then the players play the 
original game G. 휇 is called a correlated equilibrium (Aumann 1974, 1987) of the 
game G if following the recommendations form a Nash equilibrium in the extended 
game G휇 , that is, following the recommendations is the best response for each player 
when all others are also following.
One may use a device, 휇 , in a different way for a finite normal form game to get a 
coarser notion of correlation. A game G may be extended to a game G′
휇
 in which the 
strategies of a player are to commit to the correlation device 휇 , or to play any strat-
egy in G. If all the players commit to the device, an outcome is chosen by the device 
according to the probability distribution 휇 . If one of the players unilaterally deviates, 
while the others commit to the device, the deviant faces the marginal probability 
distribution 휇′
i
 over s−i ∈ S−i which is given by 휇�i (s−i) =
∑
si∈Si
휇(si, s−i) . 휇 is called 
a coarse correlated equilibrium of the game G if committing to the device forms a 
Nash equilibrium in the extended game G′
휇
 , that is, accepting the device is the best 
response for each player when all others are also accepting.1
We can think of one specific type of correlation device, for which recom-
mendations are “public”. Given a correlation device 휇 , a strategy profile s 
( = (s1,… , sn) ), is called a public recommendation, if 𝜇(s) > 0 and the conditional 
probability of (s−i) given si is 1, for all i. A correlation device 휇 is called a public 
device if for all s ∈ S , either 휇(s) = 0 or s is a public recommendation. A public 
1 This notion is due to Moulin and Vial (1978) who called this equilibrium concept a correlation 
scheme. Young (2004) and Roughgarden (2009) introduced the terminology of coarse correlated equilib-
rium that was later adopted by Ray and Sen Gupta (2013) and Moulin et al. (2014), while Forgó (2010) 
called it a weak correlated equilibrium.
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device may even be considered as a “sunspot” device (Ray 2002; Polemarcha-
kis and Ray 2006; Ray and Sen Gupta 2013), as players may “coordinate” using 
such public recommendations as sunspots. Clearly, a public device is a correlated 
equilibrium if and only if all the public recommendations in the device are (pure) 
Nash equilibria.
In this paper, we consider the two-person game, G0 , in which each player has 
three pure strategies (player 1’s pure strategies are A, B and C while player 2’s are X, 
Y and Z) (Table 1).
(A, X) is the unique Nash equilibrium of G0 , with payoffs (3, 3). Also note that 
the strategies C and Y are strictly dominated (by A and X for player 1 and 2 respec-
tively). One can thus analyse this game by iterative elimination of dominated strate-
gies and get the profile (A, X) as the unique outcome (having eliminated C and Y, in 
the reduced game A dominates B and X dominates Z). We modify the payoffs in G0 
to get other similar games labelled respectively as G1 , G2 and G3 and use them for 
our purpose (Table 2).
The structure of the above games is clearly very similar to that of the original 
game G0 ; in all these games, strategies C and Y are strictly dominated and (A, X) is 
the unique Nash and correlated equilibrium.
We consider a specific correlation device which is an equally-weighted lottery of 
three outcomes including the Nash equilibrium, as in Table 3. This device is a pub-
lic device as the probabilities are positive only for the outcomes (A, X), (B, Y) and 
(C, Z) that are public recommendations.
The public device in Table 3 is not a correlated equilibrium (for the games G0 , G1 , 
G2 and G3 ) as not all three public recommendations in the device are Nash equilibria 
of the game. For example, if the outcome (B, Y) is selected by the device and play-
ers 1 and 2 are recommended to play B and Y respectively, then player 2 will not 
Table 1  The game G0
Table 2  Three further games
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follow the recommendation Y (and play X instead); similarly, if the outcome (C, Z) 
is selected by the device, then player 1 will not follow the recommendation C (and 
play A instead). The Nash outcome (A, X), that is, the device with probability 1 on 
(A, X), is the only correlated equilibrium of these games.
The device however is indeed a coarse correlated equilibrium for G0 (and simi-
larly for games G1 , G2 and G3 ), that is, committing to the device is the best response 
of a player when the other player is committing as well. Given that player 2 commits 
to the device, in G0 , player 1 gets an expected payoff of 103  ( =
1
3
(3 + 5 + 2) ) from 
committing; however, if player 1 decides not to commit and instead plays the game, 
player 1 gets an expected payoff of 8
3
 ( = 1
3
(3 + 1 + 4) ) from choosing the pure strat-
egy A, gets 2 ( = 1
3
(1 + 5 + 0) ) from B and 1 ( = 1
3
(1 + 0 + 2) ) from C.
It should be also noted that the device in Table 3 is not the unique coarse corre-
lated equilibrium for our games; a (public) device which is a lottery with probability 
1
2
 each over the outcomes (B, Y) and (C, Z) is also a coarse correlated equilibrium for 
these games, giving an even higher payoff (3.5 to each of the two players in G0 ). The 
chosen device (in Table 3) includes the Nash equilibrium; also, it picks outcomes 
that are either Nash or symmetric around the Nash point and thus is similar to a 
Nash-centric device.2 The device in Table 3 is a coarse correlated equilibrium for 
each of the games G1 , G2 and G3 with an expected payoff to each player of 73 , 
16
3
 and 
22
3
 , respectively improving upon the respective Nash payoff of 2, 4 and 5.
In a coarse correlated equilibrium, committing to the device is a Nash equilib-
rium of the extended game; however, this equilibrium may not be unique and there 
may be other (Nash) equilibria of the extended game.3 Indeed for the game G0 (and 
Table 3  The public correlation device
Table 4  The induced 2 × 2 games from G0 , G1 , G2 and G3
2 A “Nash-centric” device is a symmetric public distribution that picks only outcomes that are Nash and 
equidistant from the Nash point; see Ray and Sen Gupta (2013) and Moulin et al. (2014) for details.
3 The problem of multiple equilibria for correlated equilibrium has been well-established in the literature 
(Ray 2002; Kar et al. 2010).
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similarly for G1 , G2 and G3 ), the strategy profile of not committing to the device 
by both players and subsequently playing (A, X) in the game is also a Nash equi-
librium. To see this, consider player 1(2) in G0 and assume that player 2(1) is not 
committing to the device and is playing X (A); if now player 1(2) commits to the 
device, the device will pick any strategy for player 1(2) with probability 1
3
 each and 
thus the expected payoff of player 1(2) is 5
3
 ( = 1
3
(3 + 1 + 1) ) from committing to the 
device when player 2(1) is playing X(A), which is less than 3 that player 1(2) would 
have got by not committing to the device and playing A(X). We formally analyse the 
induced 2 × 2 game(s), G0 (and similarly for G1 , G2 and G3 ) as shown in Table 4 in 
each of which there are only two strategies for the players, namely, “commit to the 
device (Com)” and “do not commit and then play A (X)”. There are two Nash equi-
libria in each game. The first equilibrium, (Com, Com), is payoff-dominant; the sec-
ond Nash equilibrium (of not committing to the device) is ex-ante sub-optimal with 
the payoff (3 in G0 ) for either player and is less than the expected payoff from the 
coarse correlated equilibrium ( 10
3
 in G0 ). However, note that the Nash equilibrium 
(A, X) is risk-dominant (Harsanyi and Selten 1988; Harsanyi 1995) in the induced 
game.
3  Experimental design
Following the theoretical notions presented earlier, we first present our treatments 
and our own hypotheses, some of which are already confirmed in the existing litera-
ture. Our main purpose is to test the concept of coarse correlated equilibrium in our 
game(s). However, as a baseline, we first have two treatments in which we analyse 
the game G0 with the notions of Nash and correlation. In the first of these treat-
ments, namely, the Nash treatment, we just use the game G0 without any kind of cor-
relation device. We expect to find evidence from our Nash treatment in favour of our 
Hypothesis 1 as it is fairly well-established in the existing literature for such games 
with unique equilibrium outcomes.
Hypothesis 1 In the Nash treatment (for the game G0 ), subjects do not play the dom-
inated strategies, C and Y  , and play the unique Nash equilibrium (A,X).
In our second treatment, the correlated treatment, we use the device in Table 3 to 
send non-binding recommendations to the subjects to test whether these recommen-
dations are followed or not, with the following hypothesis in mind, as the Nash point 
(A, X) is the only correlated equilibrium for the game G0.
Hypothesis 2 In the correlated treatment (for the game G0 ), subjects follow the rec-
ommendation (A,X) ; however, they do not follow the recommendations of (B,Y) 
and (C, Z) and instead play the unique Nash equilibrium of the game, (A,X) , in those 
cases.
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This behaviour is based on the results in the literature on correlated equilibrium 
(see Cason and Sharma 2007; Duffy and Feltovich 2010; Bone et al. 2013; Duffy 
et al. 2017; Anbarci et al. 2018).
Finally, in the third treatment with the game G0 , the coarse correlated treatment, 
we use the same device (as in Table 3) as a commitment device, rather than for send-
ing recommendations, to test the concept of coarse correlation. One could perhaps 
expect, as in the existing literature on correlated equilibrium, the theoretical predic-
tion to be observed here, that is, the device will be accepted.
Hypothesis 3 In the coarse correlated treatment, subjects commit to the device for 
the game G0.
There could be a couple of justifications behind Hypothesis 3. One may expect 
individuals to accept the device with higher expected payoffs (than the Nash payoff). 
Also, as the structure of our device is similar to that of “sunspots” (Ray 2002; Pole-
marchakis and Ray 2006), following the well-known experimental literature on sun-
spots (initiated by Duffy and Fisher 2005), one may hypothesise that the theoretical 
notion of coarse correlation will be validated by our experiment as well. However, 
an alternative hypothesis can also be put forward here.
Hypothesis 3a In the coarse correlated treatment, subjects reject the device and then 
play (A,X) in the game G0.
As we explained earlier, rejecting the device and playing (A, X) is the risk-domi-
nant equilibrium in the induced game. Further, Hypothesis 3a can be justified as the 
coarse correlated equilibrium results in unequal payoffs while the outcome (A, X) 
in the game may appear to be fair to the subjects. Along with this issue of fairness 
(Fehr and Schmidt 1999), one may also note that although the expected payoff for an 
individual from accepting the device is higher than that from the Nash equilibrium 
of the game, however, the outcomes chosen by the device have consequences (Ham-
mond 1988); two of these three outcomes involve some inequality, in each of which 
a player, randomly chosen, gets more payoff than the other. Another motivation for 
our Hypothesis 3a could be how subjects behave in case of strategic uncertainty (see 
the literature on two-player coordination games with multiple equilibria that are 
Pareto ranked, e.g., Van Huyck et al. 1990).
The main result in this paper therefore will tell us which of the above two is 
more sustained. Moreover, as a robustness check for the coarse correlated treatment, 
we run two additional treatments. As it will be described more clearly below, in 
all our treatments, subjects interacted for a few rounds. The first robustness check 
aims to test whether behaviour changes when the interaction is repeated instead of 
an approximated one-shot interaction. To this end we run our fixed-match coarse 
correlated treatment, which follows the exact same structure as in the coarse cor-
related treatment, with the only difference being that the pair-matching remains 
fixed through all rounds. The multi-game coarse correlated treatment aims to test 
the validity of coarse correlation when the subjects face different games; here, 
1 3
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subjects face the games G1 , G2 andG3 as well as the original game G0 . In support 
of the robustness of our design, we expect both our fixed-match coarse correlated 
treatment and the multi-game coarse correlated treatment to have similar levels of 
accepting the device as in the coarse correlated treatment.
On top of these treatments involving games, we also run a couple of treatments 
in which we considered just the lottery part of the device. As a fair comparison, we 
study the differences, if any, between the choices made in the coarse correlated treat-
ment with a lottery treatment that we call the paired lottery treatment. In this treat-
ment, subjects have to choose between a safe option that yields payoffs £3 for both 
individuals in the pair, or a lottery which yields either ( £3 , £3 ) or ( £5 , £2 ) or ( £2 , 
£5 ), with equal chances, for the two paired individuals respectively.
In the second, namely, the individual lottery treatment, the subjects are asked to 
choose among a sure outcome and a lottery to contrast with the coarse correlated 
treatment. In this choice problem, a participant has to choose between the lottery 
that picks one of three outcomes £2 , £3 and £5 each with probability 1
3
 and the sure 
(with probability 1) outcome of £3 . We have designed two very similar individual 
choice problems that mirror the outcomes chosen by the device in the game G0 for 
two players; the only difference between these two choice problems used is the fram-
ing (the order) of the outcomes in the lottery ( £2 , £3 and £5 as opposed to £5 , £3 and 
£2 ). Note that those who do accept the lottery (over the sure outcome of £3 ) are not 
necessarily risk-averse or risk-seeking; conversely, risk-neutral or risk-seeking indi-
viduals and even some risk-averse individuals (for whom the certainty equivalent 
is between £3 and £ 10
3
 ) would accept the lottery. It is thus not designed to measure 
subjects’ risk preferences. Indeed, choosing the lottery for an individual in our indi-
vidual lottery treatment can be viewed as similar to accepting the device for a player 
in the coarse correlated treatment, whatever be their risk-attitude. The choices for 
the subjects in our lottery treatments and in the coarse correlated treatment are the 
same; moreover, the paired lottery treatment takes into consideration the interactive 
nature of payoffs. Therefore, one may assume ex-ante the following hypothesis.
Hypothesis 4 The level of accepting the lottery and committing to the device in 
(two) lottery treatments and (three) coarse correlated treatments are similar.
3.1  Design
In the Nash, correlated, coarse correlated, fixed-match coarse correlated and multi-
game coarse correlated treatments involving the game(s), each subject was first 
assigned to a role of either a row or a column player, as the game(s) under investiga-
tion is (are) not symmetric. These roles were held fixed throughout the experiment. 
We labelled the row and column players as Red and Blue individuals respectively. 
In the paired lottery treatment, subjects were also split in two groups: Red and Blue 
and formed pairs; both individuals submitted their choices and the choice of one of 
the two was implemented; the subjects knew that for every round there was a 50% 
chance that their choice would be implemented. In the individual lottery treatment 
as well, subjects were split in two groups: Red and Blue. Red individuals could see 
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the outcomes of the lottery in the order £3 , £5 , £2 while Blue individuals could see 
it in the form £3 , £2 , £5 . In both these lottery treatments, the subjects’ type (Blue or 
Red) was fixed between rounds.
In all our treatments, subjects interacted for a total of 20 rounds. In every treat-
ment, except obviously in the fixed-match coarse correlated treatment, there was a 
new random matching of pairs in every round; participants interacted in groups of 
6 (6 are assigned as Blue individuals and 6 as Red individuals). This was imple-
mented, following the common practice, in order to create an environment as close 
as possible to a one-shot interaction between subjects. In addition, there was no 
way for a participant to identify the opponent with whom they were matched. In the 
multi-game coarse correlated treatment, each game was played for 5 rounds and the 
games appeared in random order in an effort to mitigate potential order effects. In 
our study, we have collected data from several sessions, with one matching group 
consisting of 12 subjects in each session. Each subject participated in only one treat-
ment. As the groups remain fixed during the experiment, each matching group rep-
resents an independent observation, except of course in the fixed-match coarse cor-
related treatment in which there are in total 12 independent observations.
The overview of the experimental sessions is summarised in Table 5 above.
3.2  Procedure
The experiment was conducted at the Lancaster Experimental Economics Lab 
(LExEL). In total, 264 subjects (out of which 53% were females) participated in 
seven treatments. The participants were mostly undergraduate students from the 
Lancaster University, from various fields of studies and were invited using the 
ORSEE recruitment system (Greiner 2015). The experiment was computerised and 
the experimental software was developed in Python.
All sessions followed identical protocol. Upon arrival at the lab, participants were 
randomly allocated to computer terminals. At the beginning of a session, subjects 
were seated and given a set of printed experimental instructions (see the Online 
Appendix) which were also read aloud so as to ensure common knowledge. After 
the instructions phase, the participants were asked to complete a brief questionnaire 
Table 5  Experimental design
Treatment #Subs. #Indep. Obs. #Rounds #Realised Obs.
Paired lottery treatment 24 2 20 480
Individual lottery treatment 48 4 20 960
Nash treatment 48 4 20 960
Correlated treatment 48 4 20 960
Coarse correlated treatment 48 4 20 960
Fixed-match coarse correlated treatment 24 12 20 480
Multi-game coarse correlated treatment 24 2 20 480
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(see the Online Appendix) to confirm that there were no misunderstandings regard-
ing the game, the matching procedure, the correlation device and the payoffs. When 
the subjects had completed the questionnaire, we made sure that they had all the 
answers correct. The experiment did not proceed until every subject had the correct 
answers to these questions. Subjects could not communicate with each other, neither 
could they observe the choices of other participants during the experiment.
Effort was made to use neutral language in the instructions for the experiment, 
to avoid any potential connotations. The actions in the games were represented as 
choices A, B and C (X, Y and Z) for the row (column) player; the opponent player 
was labelled as the counterpart. Any recommendation in the correlated treatment 
was given in a format so that the subjects are not influenced (to follow the recom-
mendations). Similarly, in the coarse correlated, fixed-match coarse correlated and 
the multi-game coarse correlated treatments, the commitment choice was framed as 
whether a participant would like the computer to choose according to the device; it 
was made clear that the choice is entirely up to the participants.
For each round, subjects had 1.5 min (2.5 min in the coarse correlated, fixed-
match coarse correlated and the multi-game coarse correlated treatments) for the 
first 10 rounds to confirm their choices and 1 min (1.5 min in coarse correlated, 
fixed-match coarse correlated and the multi-game coarse correlated treatments) for 
the remaining 10 rounds. If no decision was made by that time, the software was 
programmed to randomly pick one of the choices in the corresponding treatment.4
In the individual lottery, paired lottery and Nash treatments, subjects simply 
clicked on their preferred choice and when ready, they could confirm their choice by 
clicking the “OK” button. The framework in the correlated treatment was the same 
as in the Nash treatment with the difference that now an individual recommendation 
was made to the pair on what action to choose. The software was programmed to 
generate i.i.d. recommendations for each pair, based on a uniform distribution over 
the three possible outcomes. The recommendations were uniquely generated for 
each session in the correlated treatment. In the correlated, coarse correlated, fixed-
match coarse correlated and the multi-game coarse correlated treatments, the device 
was commonly known to the players and was implemented using a random number 
generator programmed to create recommendations or actions based on the probabil-
ity distribution of the device.
In the coarse correlated, fixed-match coarse correlated and the multi-game coarse 
correlated treatments, the choice was made in one or two stages, depending on whether 
subjects were willing to commit to the correlation device or not. During the first stage, 
the subjects could see the correlation device and were asked whether they would like 
to allow the computer to make a choice for them (equivalent to committing to the 
device). There are three possible cases: (1) if both members of the pair did not want to 
commit, then the second stage appeared on their screens, identical to the framework of 
the Nash treatment (the corresponding game without any correlation device or recom-
mendations), in which the subjects could choose their preferred action; (2) in the case 
4 This happened overall only in 9 cases in various sessions. The results are identical even if we omit 
these observations.
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where both members of the pair were willing to commit to the device, there was no 
second stage, the computer was randomly choosing one of the possible three outcomes 
and the subjects were receiving the corresponding payoff; (3) finally, if a member of 
the pair wanted to commit and the other did not, then the latter could see the second 
stage of the game and indicate her choice while for the former, the choice was ran-
domly made by the computer based on the correlation device; the payoff was then 
determined by the combination of the randomly chosen action by the computer and the 
action that the other individual picked. Note that in the various coarse correlated treat-
ments, when a subject chooses to reject the device, the subject is not informed (before 
own action choice) whether or not the opponent chose also to reject the device.
At the end of each round, after the subjects have made and confirmed their choices, 
they were given the relevant feedback. In the individual and paired lottery treatments, 
the subjects were informed about their payoffs in that round; in the paired lottery treat-
ment, the pair was also informed of whose choice was implemented by the computer. 
In the Nash, correlated, coarse correlated, fixed-match coarse correlated and the multi-
game coarse correlated treatments, the subjects were informed of own and opponent’s 
choice, own and opponent’s payoff, plus, own and opponent’s recommendation (in the 
correlated treatment), own and opponent’s commitment choice (in the coarse corre-
lated, fixed-match coarse correlated and the multi-game coarse correlated treatments).
After 20 rounds, the experimental session ended and the subjects were privately 
paid, according to their point earnings. In all the treatments, we used an exchange 
rate of 1 : 1 ( £1 per point).5 For the payment, the random incentive mechanism was 
implemented; two rounds out of the total 20 were randomly selected for all the par-
ticipants. The payments were made in private and in cash, directly after the end of 
the experiment. The average payment was £9.94 including a show-up fee of £3.00 
and the experimental sessions lasted less than 45 min that correspond to an approxi-
mate hourly rate of £13.25 ($17.23) which is considerably higher than usual student-
jobs in the UK that offer about £8.00 ($10.40) per hour.
4  Results and analysis
We first provide a descriptive analysis of our results from our experimental sessions.
4.1  Nash and correlated treatments
(A,  X), which is the unique outcome of the iterative elimination of strictly domi-
nated strategies and thus the unique Nash equilibrium outcome, is played in our 
Nash treatment; overall, 433 out of 480 ( 90.2% ) of the outcomes played is the Nash 
equilibrium outcome, (A, X). We also note that the two strictly dominated strategies 
in the game, C (for row players) and Y (for column players) have been chosen only 
5 Due to the 1 : 1 exchange rate, no rounding of payments was needed; subjects were paid exactly what 
they had earned. This keeps the connection between real incentives and the incentives stated in the 
instructions, which is perhaps lost in many experiments using rounding.
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in 10 ( 2.1% ) and 5 ( 1.1% ) cases, respectively. In line with the existing literature, our 
Hypothesis 1 thus finds support in the observed data from this treatment.
To check whether the frequency of the Nash outcome (A, X) played is increasing 
(over time) or not, we formally compared the frequency of the outcome (A, X) and 
the individual choices of A and X in the first 5 rounds with that in the final 5 rounds 
using a suitable parametric z -test and found that the difference is indeed statistically 
significant.6
Finding 1 The dominated strategies, C and Y  , have not been chosen by the subjects 
in the Nash treatment. The Nash equilibrium, (A,X) , is played, with an increasing 
trend over time.
We then look at the correlation device used for the game in the correlated treatment 
and check whether the individuals followed the recommendations from the device or 
not. In theory, the correlation device first selects one of the three possible outcomes, 
(A, X), (B, Y) and (C, Z) with probability 1
3
 each; indeed, the actual frequencies of these 
recommendations in our correlated treatment were 163 ( 34% ), 149 ( 31% ) and 168 
( 35% ), respectively. We do find that the Nash equilibrium outcome (A, X), when rec-
ommended, is followed in 145 (out of 163) times; furthermore, (A, X) is the most fre-
quently chosen outcome given the other two recommendations, respectively, 101 (out 
of 149) and 111 (out of 168) times. We also note that overall in this treatment, A is 
chosen by row players (426 times; 88.8% ) and X by column players (395 times; 82.3% ). 
One may be interested in checking whether following or playing (A, X) increased over 
time or not; we do observe an increasing trend of playing (A, X) over time.7
Finding 2 The outcome (A,X) has been played when recommended, however the 
recommendations (B,Y) and (C, Z) have not been followed and instead (A,X) has 
been played; in all these three cases, the strategy profile (A,X) has been played with 
an increasing trend over time.
Based on Finding  2 above, we can say our experimental data support Hypoth-
esis 2 that the individuals play (A, X), either by following the (good) recommenda-
tion of playing (A, X) or not following other recommendations and instead playing 
the unique Nash equilibrium of the game. As already mentioned, results similar to 
our Finding 2 are well-established in the experimental literature on correlated equi-
librium (see Cason and Sharma 2007; Duffy and Feltovich 2010; Bone et al. 2013; 
Duffy et al. 2017; Anbarci et al. 2018).
6 As independent observations, here we considered the session averages of the frequencies and com-
pared them. The p-value for the outcome (A, X) is 0.000 and those for the individual strategies A and X 
respectively are 0.004 and 0.048.
7 As in the Nash treatment, here as well, we considered the session averages as independent observa-
tions. The difference in the percentages of playing (A, X) when (A, X) has been recommended for rounds 
1–5 ( 76.3% ) and for rounds 16–20 ( 97.7% ) is indeed statistically significant at 5% level ( p = 0.034 ), 
based on a (parametric) z-test; similarly, the difference in the corresponding percentages from any recom-
mendations ( 56.7% and 86.7% ) is also statistically significant at 5% level ( p = 0.037).
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4.2  Coarse correlated treatments
In our coarse correlated treatment, only 31 out of 480 ( 6.5% ) pairs (that is, both 
individuals in a pair) committed to the device to get the expected payoff of 10
3
.8 On 
the other hand, in 305 pairs ( 63.5% ), both players did not commit to the correla-
tion device. The frequencies (and the percentages) of individually committing to the 
device over 20 rounds (that is, out of 480 observations each, for row and for column 
players) are 119 ( 24.8% ) and 92 ( 19.2% ), respectively. This difference between the 
row and column players’ committing is not significant ( p = 0.482 ); however, we do 
note a statistically significant decreasing time-trend for the individual players com-
mitting to the device ( p = 0.000).9
We summarise our finding for the coarse correlated treatment which turns out to 
be robust against both variations, the fixed-match coarse correlated treatment and 
the multi-game coarse correlated treatment.
Finding 3 A low proportion of subjects committed to the device in the coarse cor-
related treatment, less so over time.
Based on Finding 3 above, we can say that our Hypothesis 3a finds support in our 
data.
In the fixed-match coarse correlated treatment, only 22 out of 240 ( 9.2% ) pairs 
committed to the device which is not significantly ( p = 0.190 ) different from that 
( 6.5% ) in the main coarse correlated treatment, as reported above. The frequencies 
(and the percentages) of individually committing to the device in this treatment are 
41 out of 240 ( 17.1% ) and in 42 out of 240 ( 17.5% ) respectively for row and column 
players; these percentages clearly are not significantly different ( p = 0.903).
In our multi-game coarse correlated treatment, only 11 out of 240 ( 4.6% ) pairs 
committed to the device, which is also not significantly different ( p = 0.312 ) from 
the main coarse correlated treatment. The frequencies (and the percentages) of indi-
vidually committing to the device in this treatment are 58 out of 240 ( 24.2% ) and 
in 43 out of 240 ( 17.9% ) respectively for row and column players; unlike the fixed-
match coarse correlated treatment, these percentages are however indeed signifi-
cantly different at 10% level ( p = 0.093).
4.3  Playing Nash
We first focus on how individual behaviour in our baseline game varied in differ-
ent treatments, in particular, on the choice of A and X (over B, C and Y,   Z) in the 
8 In these 31 cases, the chosen (picked by the computer at random) outcomes are: (A, X) in 10 cases, 
(B, Y) in 9 cases and (C, Z) in the rest 12 times, with the individual average payoffs in these observations 
being 3.09 and 3.38 for row and column players, respectively.
9 As earlier, we considered the session averages as independent observations.
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games in our Nash, correlated and coarse correlated treatments and see if there is 
any important differences across these series.
As already noted, in our correlated treatment, having received recommendations 
of either (B, Y) or (C, Z), the individuals chose the outcome (A, X) in 212 out of 317 
cases ( 66.88% ). We also observed in our coarse correlated treatment, in 305 pairs 
out of 480 ( 63.5% ), both players did not commit to the correlation device; having 
rejected the device, these pairs played the game (as in the Nash treatment) and they 
chose the outcome (A, X) in 238 out of these 305 cases ( 78% ). In the fixed-match 
coarse correlated treatment, we found both players did not commit to the device 
in 179 pairs out of 240 ( 74.6% ); having rejected the device, these pairs played the 
outcome (A, X) in 138 out of 179 cases ( 77.1% ). Finally, in our multi-game coarse 
correlated treatment, we found both players did not commit to the device in 150 
pairs out of 240 ( 62.5% ); having rejected the device, these pairs played the out-
come (A, X) in 127 cases ( 84.6% ). Also, we can report that the percentage of playing 
(A,  X) in our Nash treatment ( 90.2% , as reported above) is significantly different 
from those in the correlated ( p = 0.000 ) and borderline significant from those in the 
coarse correlated ( p = 0.059 ) treatments.
We now display these findings in one figure to compare the frequencies of 
playing (A, X) in our different treatments. Figure 1 above presents in six different 
Fig. 1  Playing (A, X) in different scenarios
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scenarios from our treatments, the proportions of (A, X) played respectively in (1) 
the Nash treatment, (2) the correlated treatment, conditional on the recommendation 
of (A, X) only, (3) the correlated treatment, conditional on the recommendations of 
either (B, Y) or (C, Z), (4) the coarse correlated treatment conditional on rejecting 
the device, (5) the fixed-match coarse correlated treatment conditional on rejecting 
the device and (6) the multi-game coarse correlated treatment conditional on reject-
ing the device.
In Fig. 1, the average percentages are shown in 5-period blocks, as they are quite 
noisy. The multi-game coarse correlated treatment data includes all the games.10 We 
here note that all the plots in Fig. 1 follow the same pattern with an increasing trend 
to play (A, X). We have indeed performed necessary tests to check if there is any sig-
nificant difference in the proportions of playing (A, X) among these cases, involving 
15 pairwise comparisons and have found no significant differences.
4.4  Lottery treatments: paired and individual
In contrast with the different coarse correlated treatments, we observe that 317 out 
of 480 ( 66% ) individuals accepted our paired lottery and thereby asked the com-
puter to make the choice for them and their counterparts. The frequencies (and the 
percentages) of accepting the paired lottery by the two different types of individuals 
are 166 out of 240 ( 69.2% ) and 152 out of 240 ( 63.3% ), respectively for the Red and 
Blue individuals; these percentages are not significantly different.11 Also, we find 
that there is no significant difference between the percentages in the first and the last 
five rounds for either types ( p = 0.439 for Red and p = 0.456 for Blue), indicating 
no time-trend in accepting the paired lottery.
We then observe in our individual lottery treatment that681 out of 960 ( 70.9% ) 
individual choices accepted the lottery, in comparison to 317 out of 480 ( 66% ) in 
the paired lottery, as reported above; this difference (between these two percentages) 
is indeed not statistically significant ( p = 0.057 ). 345 out of 480 ( 71.9% ) individual 
choices of the Red type and 336 out of 480 ( 70% ) Blue individual choices accepted 
the computerised lottery.12 As in the paired lottery treatment, we find that these per-
centages of accepting the lottery are not statistically different between the two types 
( p = 0.522).
We thus conclude that the findings from the paired lottery treatment are very sim-
ilar to those in the individual lottery treatment. Our conclusion in this subsection 
therefore is that most (about 7 out of 10) individuals preferred the given lottery with 
an expected payoff of 10
3
 to the sure outcome of 3 which indicates that they are either 
10 One may present specific information about how this behaviour varied across different games in the 
multi-game coarse correlated treatment, separately for each game; however, we find no systematic differ-
ences among these games.
11 We considered the subject averages as independent observations to compare them. The p-value for the 
total frequency is 0.421.
12 The realised average payoffs from the lottery for these individuals respectively were £3.32 for the Red 
group and £3.34 for the Blue group.
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risk-neutral or risk-seeking or at best mildly risk averse; we also confirm that there is 
no framing effect in this case as the individuals of Blue type did not find the lottery 
less attractive than the individuals of Red type did.
Finding 4 A high proportion of individuals accepted the lottery in the paired and 
individual lottery treatment.
Finding 4 above is in direct contrast with our finding from the coarse correlated 
treatment (Finding  3) in which a very low proportion of subjects committed to 
the correlation device, less so over time; based on Finding 4, one can say that our 
Hypothesis 4 does not find support in our data.
4.5  Accepting the device/lottery
We now show in one figure the frequencies of accepting the correlation device and 
choosing the lottery in our different treatments. Figure 2 above presents in five dif-
ferent scenarios from our treatments, the proportions of accepting the device or the 
lottery respectively in (1) the coarse correlated treatment, (2) the fixed-match coarse 
correlated treatment (3) the multi-game coarse correlated treatment conditional on 
rejecting the device (4) paired lottery treatment, and (5) individual lottery treatment. 
Fig. 2  Accepting the correlation device or the lottery
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As in Fig.  1, the average percentages are shown in 5-period blocks in Fig.  2; the 
multi-game coarse correlated treatment data includes all the games.13
Figure 2 clearly shows that choosing the lottery is very common in our (paired 
and individual) lottery treatments, whereas accepting the device is fairly rare in 
various coarse correlated treatments. We can thus reject Hypothesis 3 and instead 
conclude that Hypothesis 3a finds support in our experiment. As explained earlier, 
this observed phenomenon of not committing to the device can be explained as an 
equilibrium behaviour as well. We also conclude that the findings for the coarse cor-
related treatment are robust against a change of our design to a fixed-match and also 
when we change the payoffs in the game suitably.
We now report our findings from Probit regressions to assess the choice of com-
mitting to the device or accepting the lottery (that serves as our dependent variable). 
The independent variables used are Round that takes integer values from 2 to 20 for 
different rounds, Row (takes value 1 when the individual is a row player), PastCom-
mit (takes value 1 when the device or the lottery was committed to in the previous 
round) and PastOppoCommit (takes value 1 when the device was committed to by 
the opponent in the previous round).
We first estimate the model using the pooled data from the coarse correlated, 
the multi-game coarse correlated and the fixed-match coarse correlated treatments. 
Dummies are used for the fixed-match treatment and for the three different games 
Table 6  Probit regression on 
accepting the device in different 
coarse correlated treatments
*Denotes significance at the 10% level, **at the 5% level and *** at 
the 1% level
Dependent variable: Commit = 1 , if the device is committed to; = 0 , 
otherwise
Number of observations: 1824; Pseudo R2 = 0.3459
Independent variables Marginal effects Robust 
standard 
errors
p values
Round − 0.0074∗∗∗ 0.002 0.000
Row 0.0336 0.030 0.257
PastCommit 0.3182∗∗∗ 0.050 0.000
PastOppoCommit 0.1554∗∗∗ 0.031 0.000
Fixed treatment dummy − 0.0393 0.030 0.191
G1 dummy − 0.0172 0.036 0.631
G2 dummy 0.0533 0.050 0.287
G3 dummy 0.0252 0.040 0.524
13 One may present data across different games in the multi-game coarse correlated treatment, separately 
for each game; however, as in Fig. 1, we find no systematic differences among these games.
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played in the multi-game treatment ( G0 being the baseline). Table 6 above presents 
the marginal effects from this Probit regression.14
From Table 6, we conclude that not committing to the coarse correlation device 
significantly increases with time; a subject is more likely not to commit in a round if 
the subject or the opponent has not committed in the previous round.15
We then estimate a model based on the pooled data from the paired and the indi-
vidual lottery treatments. Accepting the lottery now is our dependent variable; we 
use the same independent variables as above (Round, Row and PastCommit) except 
the PastOppoCommit as it is not available for the individual lottery treatment. An 
appropriate dummy variable is used for the paired lottery treatment (individual lot-
tery treatment being the baseline). Table 7 above presents the marginal effects from 
this Probit regression.
From Table  7, we note that subjects are more likely to accept the lottery in a 
round if they have accepted in the previous round. Significant marginal effects pre-
sented in Tables  6 and  7 highlight the difference between subjects’ accepting the 
lottery and their rejecting the coarse correlation device in our treatments. Marginal 
effects of Round number in the various treatments are either negative or insignificant 
which indicate that subjects do not learn to accept the device.
Our Findings 1–4 along with the Figs. 1 and 2 are sufficient to address all of our 
hypotheses; the regression analysis in Tables 6 and 7 additionally addresses some of 
the potential explanations for our main result which is summarised below.
Table 7  Probit regression on 
accepting the lottery in different 
lottery treatments
*Denotes significance at the 10% level, **at the 5% level and ***at 
the 1% level
Dependent variable: Accept = 1 , if the lottery is chosen; = 0 , other-
wise
Number of observations: 1824; Pseudo R2 = 0.3459
Independent variables Marginal effects Robust 
standard 
errors
p values
Round 0.0032 0.003 0.245
Row − 0.0478 0.059 0.245
PastCommit 0.3141∗∗∗ 0.052 0.000
Paired treatment dummy − 0.0479 0.059 0.421
14 This regression uses one-way clustering, nested only at the session level; there is no further benefit in 
doing two-way clustering as our session-clustering takes care of all individual correlation and generates 
virtually the same results both in terms of estimates and of standard errors.
15 Note that both variables PastCommit and PastOppoCommit are lagged and thus we also ran a couple 
of more regressions, one without the PastCommit variable and the other without both PastCommit and 
PastOppoCommit and obtained very similar results.
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Main Result 1 Although subjects accept the lottery in our lottery treatments, they do 
not commit to the device; moreover, having rejected the coarse correlation device, 
subjects played the Nash equilibrium (A,X) in the game.
5  Concluding remarks
In this paper, we report the observations from an experiment comparing the level 
of the Nash equilibrium outcome played by the subjects in a game with unique pure 
Nash equilibrium, with and without the help of a specific correlation device. Our 
results from different treatments involving Nash equilibrium and correlated equilib-
rium are in line with the existing literature. However, the main treatment in this paper 
suggests that subjects do not commit to a public randomisation device that selects a 
few symmetric outcomes (including and around the Nash equilibrium) of the game 
with equal probabilities and instead play the game and choose the Nash equilibrium 
outcome; thereby, the paper raises a question about selecting an equilibrium under 
the concept of coarse correlation in this simple set-up. We also find that the choice 
of Nash equilibrium outcome is the highest in the treatment without any correlation 
device. We contrast our main result about not accepting the randomisation device in 
a game with an individual choice of accepting a lottery over the same outcomes. We 
run two versions of this lottery treatment—paired and individual—and observe that 
the subjects accept the lottery over a sure outcome in both the treatments.
What do these various treatments contribute to our understanding of correlated 
and coarse correlated equilibria? How can we interpret our findings? Our multi-
game coarse correlated treatment shows that moderate changes to the incentives do 
not change our main finding. The fixed-match coarse correlated treatment indicates 
that giving both players a chance to get the fair share of higher payoff doesn’t matter, 
though one could also conclude that reducing strategic uncertainty doesn’t matter. 
The treatments on individual lottery and the coarse correlated equilibrium suggest 
that the rejection of the correlation device is not due to subjects’ risk attitudes; com-
bined with the finding from our paired lottery treatment, one can perhaps rule out 
the so-called “other-regarding preferences” in this context. Another plausible reason 
why the subjects rejected the device could be the issue of fairness (Fehr and Schmidt 
1999); however, one may argue that the inequity aversion argument has been, to a 
large extent, controlled for in our paired lottery treatment. One could thus explain 
this behaviour in the game as selecting a risk-dominant equilibrium. It can just be an 
example of risk dominance beating payoff dominance (in which case, arguably per-
haps, a very large change to incentives might change the subjects’ behaviour); other 
explanations such as strategic uncertainty may also be possible (as in Van Huyck 
et al. 1990, in which coordination-failure results from strategic uncertainty).
One may wonder whether our main finding depends on the choice of the specific 
device; admittedly, the concept of coarse correlation here requires a lot of trust in the 
device in order to be implemented, although, our chosen public device is similar to a 
Nash-centric device (Ray and Sen Gupta 2013; Moulin et al. 2014). In our set-up, it 
is clear that the deterministic Nash equilibrium in the game has a strong incumbent 
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advantage. Probably, coarse correlated equilibrium would fare better when the Nash 
outcome is completely mixed as in the above game (Table 8).16
In the above game, there is no pure Nash equilibrium (none of the diagonal ele-
ments in the payoff matrix with payoffs (3, 2) is a Nash equilibrium). The only Nash 
outcome is the completely mixed equilibrium in which the players play each strategy 
with probability 1
3
 , with payoffs ( 5
3
,
5
3
) . For this game, our public device (as in Table 3) 
is clearly not a correlated equilibrium but it is indeed a coarse correlated equilibrium 
with payoffs (3, 2) which improves upon the Nash payoffs for both players (although 
player 1 gets more than player 2). One may run such an experiment in future.
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Appendix
We provide the instructions for our experiments as an Online Appendix.
Here, we present two figures that correspond to our Figs. 1 and 2 respectively 
in this paper. Figures  3 and  4 below provide specific information about how 
behaviour varied across games in our multi-game coarse correlated treatment; as 
already mentioned in Footnotes 10 and 13, we find, from Figs. 3 and 4, no sys-
tematic differences in different games in this treatment.
In Fig.  3 below, we present the percentages of (A,  X) played conditional on 
rejection of the device by both players, for each game (each played only 5 times), 
separately within the multi-game coarse correlated treatment.
Figure  4 below shows the percentages of subjects accepting the correla-
tion device within the multi-game coarse correlated treatment, for each game 
separately.
Table 8  Another game
16 We sincerely thank Hervé Moulin for suggesting this example.
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Fig. 3  Playing (A, X) in different games in the multi-game treatment
Fig. 4  Accepting the correlation device for different games
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